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U.S. ACTION IN MICRONESIA AS A NORM OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE EFFECTUATION OF THE RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GUAM AND OTHER
NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES
Peter Ruffatto
Abstract: U.S. relations with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic
of the Marshall Islands resulted in a status of free association for these two Micronesian
nations in 1986. Meanwhile, 18 trust and non-self-governing territories still lack a status
of self-determination, including U.S.-administered Guam. U.S. action in Micronesia and
U.N. approval of such action creates a norm of customary international law, which
mandates all administering authorities of trust and non-self-governing territories to bring
to fruition these territories' right to self-determination. Although non-self-governing
territories are generally categorized under a separate legal regime from that which
governed U.S. action in Micronesia, the more appropriate view is that the U.N.
instruments under which Micronesia achieved self-determination apply equally to nonself-governing territories such as Guam. The Guam Commonwealth Act, currently under
consideration by the U.S. Congress, presents the United States with an opportunity to
meet its international legal obligation to effectuate Guamanian self-determination.
Passage would move Guam significantly closer to a status of self-determination.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the United States, as administering authority of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands,1 effectuated that territory's right to selfdetermination as set forth in U.N. instruments. In November of that year,
1 The two thousand islands which once constituted the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (ITP)
are scattered over an area in the Pacific Ocean which approximates the size of the continental United
States. The region is bordered by the equator to the South and stretches northward to include the Northern
Mariana Islands, which lie just north of Guam. This region, commonly referred to as Micronesia, has
155,000 inhabitants and covers a total land area of approximately seven hundred square miles. ARNOLD H.
LEBowrrz, DEFINING STATUS, A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS

482 (1989).
Micronesia is one of the three major divisions of Oceania. Geographically, the region includes Guam,
Kirabati, Nauru, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
The Republic of Palan, and the Federated States of Micronesia. ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 385
(1990). In this Comment, use of the term "Micronesia" refers only to the latter four entities because these
are the islands that once made up the TTPI.
The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of
Palau are commonly referred to as the Freely Associated States (FAS). In this Comment, however, the
acronym "FAS" refers only to the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
because Palau has yet to attain the status of free association. See infra, note 130.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 2 No. 2

the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
became self-governing in accordance with an agreement with the United
States which is known as the Compact of Free Association. 2 For these two
Micronesian states, the Compact and subsequent U.N. approval of 3 the
Compact marked their first break from colonial rule in almost 500 years.
For the international community, the effectuation of Micronesian selfdetermination constitutes another step towards world decolonization and a
manifestation of self-determination as a rule of international law. Decolonization remains unfinished, however, because at least 18 trust and non-selfgoverning territories still lack self-determination. 4 Guam's status as a nonself-governing territory under the plenary authority of the United States
Congress constitutes a prime example of this residual colonialism. 5 Guam's
frustration with its current political status became apparent in February,
1993, when Guam's Governor, Joseph Ada, delivered his "The State of6 the
Colony Address," rather than the usual "State of the Territory Address."
This Comment proposes that U.S. action in Micronesia, which culminated in the Compact of Free Association, creates a new norm of customary
international law. This norm requires all administering authorities of trust
and non-self-governing territories to effectuate these territories' right to selfdetermination as set forth in U.N. instruments. It prohibits these
administering authorities from holding territories in a prolonged and
2 Compact of Free Association, 48 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988) [hereinafter Compact].
3 U.N. approval of the Compact came from the Trusteeship Council in 1986. T.C. Res. 2183 (LIM),
53 U.N. TCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 14-15, U.N. Doc. T1/1901 (1986) [hereinafter Trusteeship Council
Resolution 2183 (LII)]. In 1990, the U.N. Security Council also endorsed the Compact as fulfilling the
United State's obligation to promote Micronesia's self-determination. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2972nd mtg.
at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INFI46 (1990).
Ferdinand Magellan's arrival in Guam in 1521 marked the point of first contact between Pacific Islanders and Europeans. FRANCIS HEZEL, THE FIRST TAINT OF CIT.IZATION 1 (1983). From that day on,
Micronesians experienced a growing dependency on foreign powers, coupled with a gradual diminishment
of their autonomy. CARL HEINF, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS 10-17 (1974).
4 These territories and their administering authorities include: American Samoa, Guam, United States
Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Palau) all of which are administered by the
United States; Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Gibralter,
Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands all of which are administered by the United
Kingdom; New Caledonia which is administered by France; Tokelau which is administered by New
Zealand; Western Sahara which is administered by Morocco; and East Tsmor which is administered by
Portugal. Implementation of the Declarationon the Grantingof Independence to ColonialCountries and
Peoples: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 18, at 1,5-6, U.N. Doc.
A/47/649 (1992). Note that Palau is the only area which is still under the International Trusteeship System,
while the rest of these areas are non-self-governing territories under Article 73 of the U.N. Charter. 1991
U.N.Y.B. 810, U.N. Sales No. E.92.L1.
5 LEmowrrz, supranote 1, at 363. See infra part IILA-B.
6 Joseph F. Ada, State of the Colony Address at Guam Legislative Session Hall, Agana, Guam (Feb.
26, 1993) (transcript available at Office of Guam Commission on Self-Determination, Agana, Guam).

SUMNER 1993

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GUAM

indefinite colonial status. In addition to establishing a new norm of
customary international law, U.S.-Micronesian relations aid in
understanding the right of self-determination by identifying its definition
and means of implementation. Focusing on Guam as an example of a nonself-governing territory, this Comment concludes that the norm established
by U.S. action in Micronesia reaches beyond the framework of the
International Trusteeship System to include other areas lacking selfdetermination. The Guam Commonwealth Act, now before the U.S.
Congress, presents an opportunity for the United States, as the administering
authority of Guam, to satisfy its obligation to effectuate Guamanian selfdetermination. 7 Current U.S. intransigence with respect to Guamanian selfdetermination violates international law, including the norm established by
U.S.-Micronesian relations.
This Comment continues with part IHwhich provides a brief overview
of the right to self-determination. Part III focuses on Guam as an example
of a non-self-governing territory which lacks a significant measure of selfdetermination. Part IV discusses U.S.-Micronesian relations, charting
Micronesia's progression from Trust Territory to Freely Associated States.
Part V demonstrates how a customary international law norm emerges from
Part VI discusses the content and
U.S. action in Micronesia.
implementation of the right to self-determination as illustrated by the case of
Micronesia. Part VII argues that the norm established by U.S. action in
Micronesia reaches beyond the International Trusteeship System to include
all non-self-governing territories. Finally, part VIII sets forth the reasons for
viewing the Guam Commonwealth Act as a valid expression of Guamanian
self-determination and evaluates the U.S. position on key provisions of the
Act.
II.

THE HISTORICAL 8 RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMNATION: STATUS AND
SOURCES

Repeated state practice both within and outside the U.N. has established the right of self-determination as a norm of customary international
7 On March 30,1993, Congressman Underwood from Guam introduced HR. 1521, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess., (1993) to the House Committees on Natural Resources and Ways and Means. This is a bill to
establish the Commonwealth of Guam. 139 CoNG. REC. H1738 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1993). Not coincidentally, the bill number corresponds with the year that Ferdinand Magellan arrived on Guam.
8 The author uses the term "historical" here to describe the right of self-determination as it existed
before U.S.-Micronesian relations and to distinguish this right from the new and separate norm which
emerges from U.S. action in Micronesia.
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law. 9 The U.N. Charter and U.N. action subsequent to the adoption of the
U.N. Charter constitute primary sources of the right to self-determination.
A.

The Principleof Self-Determination in the U.N. Charter

The principle of self-determination constituted a key feature of the
allied plan for organization of a stable international order after World War
11,10 and was incorporated into several provisions of the U.N. Charter. Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter states that a primary purpose of the U.N. is the
development of friendly relations among nations "based on the respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."1 1
Chapters XI and XII of the U.N. Charter, which govern the administration of non-self-governing and trust territories, are also recognized as
sources of the right to self-determination. 12 Article 73, the heart of chapter
XI, provides, in part, that the administering authorities take on the obligation
to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations
of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each
13
territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.
Article 73 applies to territories which have not yet achieved a full
measure of self-government, including both trust and non-self-governing
territories. 14 Article 76, the heart of chapter XII, applies only to territories
within the International Trusteeship System. Article 76 states that one of
the objectives of the Trusteeship System is to promote "progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be
9 Edward A. Laing, The Norm of Self-Determination, 1941-1991, 22 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 209, 217
passim (1992); UMOZURIKE 0. UMOZURIXE, SELF-DETERMINATION ININTERNATIONAL LAw 138-76, 18889 (1972). See also HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DErERMATION-THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 45 (1990) ("It would seem difficult to question [the right of
self-determination's] status as a right in international law."); cf. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREmFORY NORMS
(Jus COGENs) ININTERNATIONAL LAW 358-416 (1988) (indicating that there is a great deal of evidence that
the obligation of states not to obstruct the right of dependent peoples to external self-determination rises to
the level of a peremptory norm).
10 W. OFUATEY-KoDJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-06

(197711 Likewise, Article 55 states that its directives are "based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples."
12 MICILA POMERANCE, SEIr-DETERMINATION INLAW AND PRACTICE 9 (1982) (noting that chapters
XI and XII are principle bases of the right of self-determination although the term "self-determination"
does not appear therein). See also Laing,supra note 9, at 212.
13 U.N. CHARTER
14 Harry G. Prince, The United States, the United Nations,and Micronesia:Questionsof Procedure,
Substance, and Faith, 11 MICH. J. INV'L L. 11, 20 (1989). The U.N. criteria for when a territory has
achieved a "full measure of self-government" are set out infra in note 187.
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appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory5 and its peoples
and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."'
Although Chapters XI and XII are generally thought of as separate
legal regimes, 16 the more appropriate view is that territories which became
part of the trusteeship system under Articles 75-85 (Chapter XI are a
subset of the broader category of non-self-governing territories governed by
articles 73-74 (Chapter XI). 17 By definition, trust territories lack a full
measure of self-government, and thus constitute non-self-governing
territories. U.S. governance of Micronesia, for example, fell under both
Article 73 and Article 76,18 though commentators generally speak of U.S.19
Micronesian relations in the context of the Trusteeship System only.
Article 73, therefore, explicitly applies to both trust and non-self-governing
territories.
Moreover, the right of self-determination which is embodied in
Article 76 is essentially the same as that embodied in Article 73.20 The right
in both Articles derives from Article 1(2).21 A comparison of the language
22 In both
demonstrates that the obligation is equivalent in both Articles.
provisions, the overriding obligation is for administering authorities to
promote the development of self-government in accordance with the will of
the peoples they govern.
The primary difference between Chapter XI and Chapters XII and
XM is that the latter two chapters provide for extensive U.N. supervision.
Article 73, contained in Chapter XI, requires only that an annual report be
submitted.23 By contrast, the Trusteeship System in Chapters XII and XM
provides for the U.N. examination of petitions, U.N. visiting missions, and

15 U.N. CHARTER.
16 E/g., USHA SUD, UNtTED NATIONS AND THE NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIEs 2 (1965).
17 Prince, supra note 14, at 20. Although Articles 75-85 go on to set forth specific requirements
with respect to trust territories, Professor Prince notes that the language and organization of Chapters XI
and XI support the conclusion that Chapter XI explicitly applies to trust territories. Id. See alsoHANNUM,
supranote 9, at 18.
18 See TrusteeshipCouncil Resolution 2183 (LIII), supranote 3 (noting that both Articles 73 and 76
applied to the TIP1).
19 E.g., Naomi Hirayasu, The Process of Self-Determination and Micronesia's Future Political

Status UnderInternationalLaw, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 487,493-95,514 (1987).
20 See Laing, supra note 9, at 212; see UMOZURIKE, supra note 9, at 76; see POMERANCE, supranote

12, at9.

21 See Laing, supranote 9, at 212.

22 For the language of Articles 73 and 76 relating to self-determination see supratext accompanying
notes 13 and 15.
23 U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e).
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U.N. participation in overseeing plebiscites. 24 These are procedural
provisions, however, and do not impose additional substantive obligations
on the administering country.
B.

Further U.N. Action and the Emergence of the Principle of SelfDeterminationas a Customary InternationalLaw Norm

Despite its incorporation into the U.N. Charter, the principle had not
yet become a rule of international law when the U.N. Charter entered into
force in 1945.25 The principle of self-determination became increasingly
prominent, however, as the world experienced widespread decolonization in
the four decades following World War ]1.26 U.N. action taken subsequent to
the adoption of the U.N. Charter reaffirmed this norm. U.N. Resolution
1514, entitled the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, 27 is a landmark in the emergence of the customary
norm of self-determination. 28 The right of self-determination is also
included in the two International Covenants on human rights which were
signed in 1966.29 Finally, in 1970, members of the U.N. unanimously
adopted General Assembly Resolution 2625 which states:
[B]y virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United
Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status and to pursue their
24 Id. art. 87. A plebiscite is a vote by which the people of a region express an opinion for or against
a proposal.
zaIHANNUM, supranote 9, at 33.
26 UMOZURIKE, supra note 9, at 138-76; GORONWY J. JONES, THE UNrrED NATIONS AND THE
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF STATES 95-97, 115 (1979).
27 Declarationon the Granting ofIndependence to Colonial Countriesand Peoples, GA. Res. 1514,
U.N. GAOR, 15th sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Resolution 1514].
28 POMERANCF, supranote 12, at 11. Adopted in December, 1960, Resolution 1514 is considered an
authoritative interpretation of the U.N. Charter, id. at 10-11, and states that:
"2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
"3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a
pretext for delaying independence ....
"5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories,
without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire."
29 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 1 of both
covenants states that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
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economic, social and cultural development, and every State has
the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions
30
of the Charter.
Resolution 2625 stands out as unanimous U.N. approval of extending
the right of self-determination beyond the regime of trust and non-selfgoverning territories to include all peoples. In addition to affirming the
principle of self-determination through the Covenants and Resolutions 1514
and 2625, the international community implemented the principle in the
the principle of
form of widespread decolonization. 31 By the early 1960s,
2
self-determination existed as an international legal right.3
Shortcomings of the HistoricalRight ofSelf-Determination

C.

The right of self-determination lacks a clear definition in international
Even as the right to self-determination emerged as a customary
norm, development of its content awaited further state practice. 34 Countries
which govern groups of people who demand self-determination tend to view
the right as a right to full independence, and, therefore, these countries resist
such demands. 35 This view ignores the full range of means to achieving
self-determination. 3 6 Even though Resolution 2625 set forth a flexible
approach for implementing the right, such an approach has not been fully
37
followed.
Notwithstanding the emergence of the right to self-determination as a
customary norm and a substantial body of U.N. action reaffirming the right,
the process of decolonization remains incomplete. In 1990, 14 members of
the U.N. specifically recognized this shortcoming and affirmed the need for
law. 33

30 Declarationon Principles of InternationalLaw ConcerningFriendly Relationsand Cooperation
Among States in Accordance with the Charterof the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th
sess., Supp. No. 28 at 121, U.N. Doe A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Resolution 2625].
31 In the four decades following World War 11,over 750 million people in over 100 territories
achieved a status of self-determination. HANNKAINEN, supra note 9, at 357. For an examination of the
practice of decolonization by specific states, see OFUATEY-KODJOB, supra note 10, at 129-47.
32

ROSALYN HIGGiNS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POIMCAL

ORGANS OFTHE UNrrED NATIONS 103-04 (1963); JONES, supra note 26 at 95-96.
33 HANNUM, supranote 9, at 27; JoNES, supranote 26, at 69.
34 Laing, supranote 9, at 219.
35 HANNUM, supranote 9, at 39-40,473.
36 Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to Self-Determination:Analytical and Moral Foundations,8 ARIz.
J. INT'L COMP. L. 41, 46-47 (1991).
37 HANNuM, supra note 9, at 41. For the relevant text of Resolution 2625, see infra note 193. This
topic is taken up again infra part VI.
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further decolonization throughout the world, especially in the remaining 18
non-self-governing territories.38 In 1988, and again in 1991, the U.N. General Assembly declared the 1990's as the "International Decade for the
Eradication of Colonialism." 39 The relationship between the United States
as an administering authority and the island of Guam as a non-selfgoverning territory provides an example of an unfulfilled obligation to
promote self-determination.
I.

A.

THE CASE OF GUAM

Background

Guam has been a U.S. territory for ninety-five years, beginning in
1898 when the United States took control of the island from Spain.40 For
the first 52 years of U.S. control, the United States Department of the Navy
governed Guam through a series of naval governors. 4 1 In 1946, the U.N.
placed Guam on the original list of non-self-governing territories. 42 The
United States became the official administering authority of Guam and
assumed an obligation to promote Guamanian self-determination under
Article 73 of the U.N. Charter.43 In recent years, the U.N. reaffirmed the
United States' obligation to promote self-determination for Guam through
General Assembly resolutions. 44
In order to achieve self-determination for Guamanians, the United
States and Guam are working to change Guam's political status. From 1990,
until the end of 1992, the Guam Commission on Self-Determination (CSD)
negotiated with a U.S. task force to attain greater political autonomy for

38 InternationalDecadefor the Eradicationof Colonialism,Report of the Secretary-General,U.N.
GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda item 18, U.N. Doe. A/45/624 (1990).
39 GA. Res. 43/47, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989); G.A.
Res. 46/181, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1992).
40 Lmaowrrz, supranote 1, at 313, 316-18.
41 Id. at 313, 319; Lizabeth A. McKibben, The PoliticalRelationshipBetween the United States and
PacificIslands Entities: The Path to Self-Government in the NorthernMarianaIslands, Palau,and Guam
31 HARV. INT'L LJ. 257,287 (1990).
42 SoD, supranote 16, at 144, 191-93.
43 For the relevant text of Article 73, see supra text accompanying note 13.
44 E.g., G.A. Res. 43/42, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 244-45, U.N. Doe.
A/43/49(1989) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 43/42]; G.A. Res. 46168, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
231, U.N. Doe. A/46/49 (1992) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 46168]. See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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Guam through the newly proposed Guam Commonwealth Act (GCA). 4 5
Joseph Ada, Guam's governor, expressed Guam's general position in 1991:
We want to preserve our relationship with the United States
within a new and constitutional framework. Under our
proposal, Guam would have complete internal self-government,
with the United States continuing its jurisdiction over
appropriate defense and foreign affairs matters. 46
Guamanians support the GCA as a step toward achieving selfdetermination, which, up to this point, has been denied by the United
States.47
B.

The United States has Failed to Effectuate Guam's Right to SelfDetermination

Guamanians have achieved little in the way of self-government or
self-determination. From 1950 to 1972, the United States Congress enacted
the Organic Act legislation 48 which defined the political status of Guam.
The Organic Act and its amendments designated Guam as an unincorporated
territory, conferred U.S. citizenship upon the populace, provided for an
elected governor, and provided for an elected legislature to enact laws of
"local application." 49 The Organic Act failed to achieve self-determination
for Guam because Guam's status as an unincorporated territory affords it no
promise of attaining Statehood. 50 Rather, Guam is considered "appurtenant
to the United States and belongs to the United States but is not a part of the
United States. '5 1 Guam remains in limbo, a possession of the United States
45 Floyd Whaley, Autonomy Bid By Pacific Island of Guam Gets Boost, The Reuter Library Report,
Jan. 6,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File; see infra note 66.
46 Joseph F. Ada, Guam Wants to Govern Itself, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 7, 1991, at A18. It appears that
Guam's recent frustration with the United States' intransigence may lead to more aggressive action, such as
demands for independence. William Claiborne, Guam Seeks Upgrade in Status, Residents Threaten
IndependenceAction, WASH. POST,Feb. 10, 1993, at A14.
47 See infra text accompanying note 66.
48 McKibben, supra note 41, at 288. For the current version of this legislation, see 48 U.S.C. §§
1421-28 (1988).
49 Id.
50 By comparison, Hawaii was also a non-self-goveming territory under the administration of the
United States from 1945 until 1959 when it was admitted as a State. Yet for 60 years prior to its admission
into the Union, Hawaii was an incorporated territory, and, as such, it was destined for Statehood. S. Rep.
No. 80,86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959), reprintedin 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1346.
51 H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1949) quotedin LEmOwrrz supra note 1, at 335.
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to full
without many important privileges of Statehood such as the right
52
representation in Congress and the right to vote for the President.

The Organic Act itself is an expression of unfettered U.S. authority
over Guam. Unlike a state constitution which derives its authority from the
people governed, the Organic Act derives its power from the United States
Congress.5 3 While the Act grants plenary powers to the United States Congress, it denies Guam the power to act in the absence of a specific authorization from Congress. 54 Even as the U.S. Congress authorized a constitutional
convention in Guam, it articulated Guam's lack of real self-government: "in
the territories, Congress has the entire dominion and sovereignty, national
and local, and has full legislative power over all subjects upon which a state
legislature might act." 55
The grant of U.S. citizenship has been the most significant change in
Guam's political status since U.S. governance began. 56

Citizenship,

however, has had little effect on the powers or rights of Guamanians.
Though Guamanians initially viewed citizenship as a means to
empowerment, this change in status failed to bring meaningful political
participation or control over local affairs. 57 The United States exercises its
power over Guam without affording Guam a significant measure of selfgovernment.

C.

Steps Toward GreaterSelf-Determinationfor Guam

Guamanians have long recognized the need for greater political
autonomy. A subcommittee to the Guam legislature noted in 1974 that
52 Guam's delegate to the United States Congress has recently been given greater voting power in the
House of Representatives. Previously, delegates from Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands were allowed to vote only in House committees. A change in House Rule XII authorized
these delegates to vote in the House's Committee of the Whole. Clifford Krauss, HouseDelegates Get New
Powers,N.Y. TMES, Dec. 10, 1992, at A22. This change, however, is symbolic only and does not afford
Guam's delegate any real increase in democratic representation. Michel v. Anderson, 817 F. Supp. 126,
147-48 (D.D.C. 1993) (upholding the constitutionality of the rule change because of it's lack of effect on
the power of the delegates).
53 Lmowr1z, supra note 1,at 363.
54 See Snow v. United States, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 317,320 (1873) (setting forth the traditional doctrine that decisions made by the territory government are subject to modification by the United States
Congress). In Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., the court stated that "since Guam is an unincorporated Territory enjoying only such powers as may be delegated to it by the Congress, the government of
Guam is in essence an instrumentality of the Federal Government." 764 F.2d 1285, 1286 (1985). See also
Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits ofFormalism, 78 CAL.L. REV. 853, 864 (1990).
55 S. Rep. 94-1034,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
56 Robert F. Rogers, Guam's Questfor PoliticalIdentity, 12 PAC. STuD. 49,49 (1988); LEIMBoWr.
supranote 1,at 329.
57 Lmnowrm, supra note 1,at 335.

SUMMR 1993

RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GUAM

Guam has a viable culture which deserves preservation
1.
and protection... [and]
If political autonomy is not obtained by the people
2.
58
Guam, the death of Guam's culture is inevitable.
In 1979, the Guam electorate rejected a proposed constitution because
it lacked a local expression of self-determination. 59 Moreover, it failed to
resolve the political status question, which Guamanians felt was necessary
to answer before they would ratify a constitution. 60
After the voters rejected the proposed constitution, self-determination
became a critical issue in Guam's relationship with the United States.6 1 In
1980, the Guam legislature established the Guam Commission on Self-Determination (CSD).62 The CSD held a referendum in 1982 to determine
what political status Guam should have, resulting in about three-fourths of
the voters favoring commonwealth status, and the remaining quarter
favoring Statehood. 63 By the end of 1984, the CSD had produced a working
draft of the proposed terms of commonwealth status.64 In response to
concerns about self-determination and indigenous rights, the draft was
approved a
revised in 1985.65 Finally, in November 1987, Guam voters
66
comprehensive proposal to change Guam's political status.
Although the United States appears open to the general concept of
commonwealth status for Guam, 67 negotiations between the CSD and the
U.S. task force failed to resolve a number of specific issues concerning the
future relationship between Guam and the United States. These issues in-

58 Gayle, An Analysis of Sociat Cultural and HistoricalFactorsBearingon the PoliticalStatus of
Guam; Report submitted to the Political Status Commission of the 12th Guam Legislature (n.d.), at 76-77,
quoted in LEIBOWrIZ, supranote 1, at 328.
59 Rogers, supra note 56, at 56.
60 Id
61 rd
62 LEmaowrrz, supranote 1, at 338.
63 Id
64 Rogers, supranote 56, at 57.
65 Id at 57-59.
66 Telephone Interview with Leland Bettis, Executive Director of the Guam Commission on SelfDetermination (Apr. 7, 1993) [hereinafter Interview with Leland Bettis]. The text of the final draft of the
commonwealth proposal is now in the form of H.R. 98, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Guam
Commonwealth Act] and is commonly referred to as the Guam Commonwealth Act.
67 Second Federal Inter-Agency Task Force Report on HR. 98, the Guam Commonwealth Bill, (Jan.
1993) (on file with the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).
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elude: 1) Chamorro rights to self-determination; 6 8 2) Guam's demand for
mutual consent over the applicability of federal laws on the island; 3)
Guam's demand for a 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone around the island;
4) U.S. power of eminent domain on Guam; and 5) Guam's capacity to
69
participate in regional and international organizations. The United States
70 The first two of these issues
has refused to concede any of these issues.
71
constitute the core of the Guamanian right to self-determination and both
72
are included in the GCA. These issues will eventually be addressed by the
United States Congress when it considers the proposal in the form of the
Guam Commonwealth Act.
D.

The United States Remains Obligated to Promote Guamanian SelfDetermination UnderInternationalLaw

Because Guam remains a non-self-governing territory, international
law obligates the United States, as Guam's administering authority, to
expedite Guam's movement towards self-determination. 73 This obligation
stems primarily from its trust responsibility under U.N. Article 73 and U.N.
Resolution 1514.74 Aside from submitting annual reports to the U.N.'s
Decolonization Committee and to the U.N. General Assembly regarding

68 Of Guam's 133,152 people, approximately 47 per cent are Chamorro. Guam: Working Paper
Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on Decolonization, 47th Sess. at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.109/l 111 (1992). Chamorros are the indigenous people of Guam, and their status is an integral aspect of self-determination for Guam. It is the Chamorro people who have led the quest for commonwealth
status. McKibben, supra note 41, at 289. For a more pointed discussion of indigenous people's rights in
Guam, see U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on Decolonization, 47th Seass., 1407 mtg. at 18-30, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.109/PV.1407 (1992) (statement of Ronald F. Rivera, Organization of People for Indigenous Rights);
Guam Commonwealth: Hearing on H.R. 98 Before the Subcomm. on Insularand InternationalAffairs of
the House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1. at 278 (1989) (statement of
Attorney David Lujan, Public Member, Guam Commission on Self-Determination).
69 Interview with Leland Bettis, supra note 66.
70 Id
71 Governor Joseph F. Ada, Opening Remarks at "A Time of Change" National Conference, The
George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 10, 1993) (transcript available at Office of Guam
Commission on Self-Determination, Agana, Guam).
72 Guam Commonwealth Act, supranote 66, §§ 102, 103-202.
73 G.A. Res. 46/68, supra note 44; Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to ColonialCountries and Peoples, U.N. GAOR Rep. of the 4th Comm., 47th Seass., at 2425, 35-36, U.N. Doc. A/47/648 (1992); Guam: Working PaperPreparedby the Secretariat,U.N. GAOR
Special Decolonization Comm., 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. AJAC.109/I111 (1992).
74 G.A. Res. 46168, supranote 44.
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Guam's non-self-governing status,7675 the United States rarely acknowledges
this international legal obligation.
In recent years, the U.N. has reaffirmed the United States' duty to assist in Guam's self-determination. 77 In 1988, for example, the U.N. General
Assembly directed the United States to bring to fruition the "inalienable
right of the people of Guam to self-determination and independence in
conformity with [Resolution 1514]."78 Moreover, the U.N. called upon the
United States to "expedite the process of decolonization strictly in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the people of [Guam]." 79
While Guam continues to struggle to achieve self-determination, its
neighboring territory of Micronesia has achieved self-determination through
a negotiated agreement with the United States. Indeed, leaders from Guam
stood by as the United States implemented the Compact of Free Association
80
in Micronesia.
IV.

THE CASE OF MICRONESIA

U.S. action in Micronesia provides the starting point for showing that
such action establishes a norm of international customary law. U.S.
involvement in Micronesia began when the United States acquired control
of Micronesia in 1945.81 Self-determination for Micronesia followed more
slowly. Growing impatience in the international community, the adoption
of U.N. instruments in support of self-determination, and the emergence of
self-determination as an international legal right influenced the United
States to reevaluate and alter its policy toward Micronesian selfdetermination. Shifting its policies in the early 1960's, the United States
82
became committed to implementing Micronesian self-determination.
75 See, e.g., Guam: Working PaperPreparedby the Secretariat,U.N. GAOR Special Decolonization
Comm., 47th Sess. at 8, U.N. Doe. A/AC.109/1111 (1992).
Guam Commonwealth. Hearing on H.& 98 Before the Subcomm. on Insularand International
Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 278 (1989)
(statement of Attorney David Lujan, Public Member, Guam Commission on Self-Determination). In recent
years, the U.S. Mission to the U.N. has attempted to downplay the United States' international legal
obligation to decolonize Guam. The United States views its policy towards Guam as a domestic matter,
rather thanan international one. Interview with Leland Bettis, supra note 66. If such view prevails, the
United States would be shielded from U.N. intrusions into the matter of Guamanian self-determination.
2(7).
U.N. CHARTER art.
77 E.g., G.A. Res. 46/68, supranote 44; G.A. Res. 43/42, supra note 44.
78 G.A. Res. 43/42, supranote 44.
79 Id.
80 See infratext accompanying notes 167-69.
81 Lamowrrz, supra note 1, at 481.
82 See D. McHENRY, MIcRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 14 (1975).
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Negotiations between the United States and Micronesia culminated in an
agreement which conforms with international law8 3 and embodies self84
government and self-determination as defined by Micronesians. The U.S.
continues to be involved in Micronesia, however, as both the United States
and the Freely Associated States (FAS) attempt to give effect to the
expression of self-determination which is embodied in the Compact.
A.

The United States Takes on the Administrationof Micronesia

After Japan was defeated in World War II, it was deprived of control
over its colonies. 85 The United States assumed administration of Micronesia
under authority granted by the U.N. Charter and the International
Trusteeship System. 86 U.S. policy-makers had two competing interests as
87
they debated the nature and extent of their administration of the islands.
Those who were primarily concerned with U.S. security in the Pacific
wanted to annex Micronesia outright. 88 Those who favored self-government
non-annexation
and self-determination, and supported the international
89
movement, opposed U.S. annexation of the Island.
The competing interests of military security and respect for self-determination initially led to a compromise when Micronesia became a "strategic
trust" in accordance with an agreement between the U.N. Security Council
and the United States.90 The strategic trust relationship was unique to the
Trusteeship System,9 1 and gave the United States almost complete control
92
over the islands, especially for defense purposes. At the same time, the
83 See supranote 3.
84 LEaowrrz, supra note 1, at 657-59; John R. Haglelgam, Problems of National Unity and
Economic Development in the FederatedStates of Micronesia, 1 J. MICRONESIAN STUD. 5, 7 (1992).
85 UMOZURIcE, supra note 9, at 60. See also H.R. REP. No. 889, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprintedin 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1317, 1318.
86 The International Trusteeship System placed trustee states in a guardian relationship with territories detached from countries after World War II. The overall purpose of the system was to foster the
well-being and development of the territories into self-governing states in accordance with U.N. Charter
objectives. Prince, supra note 14, at 20; Special Issue on Non-Self-Governing Territories, 19 OBJECnVE:
JusTicE 1, 1 (1987).
87 McHENRY, supra note 82, at 2. See generally Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the
PacificIslands: Hearing on S.J. Res. 143 before the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947) [hereinafter 1947 Hearing].
88 E.g., 93 CONo. REc. 8733 (1947). See also, Prince,supranote 14, at 22.
89 Prince, supranote 14, at 22.
90 TrusteeshipAgreementfor the FormerJapaneseMandated Islands,Apr. 2-July 18, 1947, 61 Stat.
3301, T.I.A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189 [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement]. See also MCHENRY, supra
note 82, at 2; Prince, supra note 14, at 22.
91 LEmowrZ, supranote 1,at 487-88.
92 Trusteeship Agreement, supranote 90, arts. 5, 13. See also MeHenry, supranote 82, at 2, 9.
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United States assumed responsibilities under the U.N. Charter, the Trusteeship System, and the Trusteeship Agreement to promote self-government
and self-determination. 93 The provisions of the U.N. Charter which guided
the United States in its administration of the TrPI include Chapters M, XI,
and XIII.94 These provisions were supplemented by the agreement between
the United States and the U.N. Security Council. 95 Article 73 of Chapter XI
and Article 76 of Chapter XII both directed the United States, as the
administering authority, to develop self-government and to promote selfdetermination in Micronesia. 96 Article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement for
the TTPI provides that the United States will
foster the development of such political institutions as are
suited to the trust territory and shall promote the development
of the inhabitants of the trust territory toward self-government
or independence, as may be appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the trust territory and its peoples and the
97
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned ....
Despite the apparent compromises of the Trusteeship Agreement, the
98
interest in military security dominated early U.S. policy in Micronesia.
Congressman Mike Mansfield expressed the overriding purpose of the
United States in 1947: "We need these islands for our future defense ....
We have no concealed motives because we want these islands for one
purpose only and that is national security." 99 Commentators characterize
the degree of control which the United States has actually exercised over the
islands as defacto annexation. 1°°
B.

The U.S. Policy Shift During the 1960s

Initially, both the United States and the U.N. failed to focus their at101 U.S.
tention on Micronesia's political, economic, or social development.
attempts at developing Micronesia's internal political system were directed
93 See supranotes 13 and 15 and accompanying text. See infra text accompanying note 97.
94 For the relevant text of these chapters, see supra text accompanying notes 13 and 15.
95 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 90. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 83.
96 See supranotes 13 and 15 and accompanying text.
97 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 90, art. 6.
98 See 1947 Hearing,supranote 87, at 5-8.
99 93 CONG. REc. 8733 (1947).
100 S.DESMrrH, MICRONESIA AND MICROSTATES 128 (1970); Prince, supra note 14, at 22.
101 McHENRY, supranote 82,at 12-13; Prince, supra note 14, at 77.
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only at the municipal level.10 2 Because of its failure to promote economic
development, education, health care, and transportation, the U.S. administration of Micronesia came under increasing criticism from the world community.10 3 Micronesia's lack of self-government became an anomaly as
decades of decolonization followed World War 11.104 Resolution 1514, for
105
example, had a substantial impact on colonialism throughout the world.
In the Pacific areas south of Micronesia, numerous nations became
independent following the adoption of Resolution 1514, including Western
Samoa, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, and
106
Tuvalu.
Partly in response to growing obligations under international law and
partly due to criticism by the U.N. Trusteeship Council, the United States
reoriented its position with respect to Micronesia in the mid-1960's.107 The
United States began to implement programs in Micronesia addressing the
problems in education, health care, and transportation. It also renewed its
commitment to decolonization and the development of political institutions
in Micronesia. 108 Financial assistance for the islands was substantially increased.
As early as 1964, a U.N. visiting mission noted substantial improvements in Micronesia's education, health care, transportation, and political
development. 109 In that same year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior
established the Congress of Micronesia, the first territory-wide legislature in
the islands. 110 This constituted the first major advancement toward selfgovernment in Micronesia.111 By institutionalizing territory-wide selfgovernment and encouraging political participation throughout the islands,
the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia set the stage for
102 Lziowrrz, supra note 1, at 495; Note, A Macrostudy of Micronesia: The Ending of a
Trusteeship,18 N.Y.L.F. 139, 165 (1972).
103 LEaOWrrz supranote 1, at 496; McHENRY, supra note 82, at 13.
104 By 1969, the TTPI was the last territory under the International Trusteeship System. Lmowrrz,
supra note 1, at 641.
105 JONES, supra note 26, at 115; Laing, supra note 9, at 215.
106 Neal S. Solomon, The Guam Constitutional Convention of 197, 19 VA. J. INIL L. 725, 742
(1979?7 McHNRY, supra note 82, at 14; LEowrrz, supra note 1, at 496, 501; see N. M.EER. THE
CONGRESS OFMtcRoNESrm 195 (1969).
108 MELiLR, supra note 107, at 195; McHENRY, supra note 82, at 14. A combination of U.N. pressure and Micronesian initiative caused President Johnson to attempt to establish a Presidential Commission
to address the political status of the Trust Territory. This attempt stalled, however, and was quickly
superseded by Micronesia's own political status commission. LEmowrz, supra note 1,at 501.
109 McHENRY, supranote 82, at 15.
110 Dept. of the Interior Order 2882, 29 F.R. 13613 (Sept. 28, 1964).
111 Prince, supra note 14, at 81.
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Micronesia's
movement
112
determination.

towards

greater

autonomy

and

self-

Negotiations Toward the Compact

C.

Formal negotiations between the United States and Micronesia on the
future political status of Micronesia began in 1969.113 Initial negotiations
focused on several issues, including control over Micronesian land, control
11 4 During
over laws, and control over any further change in political status.
the Third Round of negotiations in 1971 it became clear that the
11 5
negotiations were leading toward free association for Micronesia.
Throughout the negotiations, Micronesia asserted the right to adopt its
own constitution.11 6 By 1975, a constitution became an immediate
necessity to formally establish Micronesian sovereignty and to ensure that a
national government would be established on the basis of Micronesian
decisions." 7 As the various districts within Micronesia showed signs of
dividing from the whole, the Constitution also became necessary to curb the
tendency toward fragmentation.1 18 In this respect, the constitutional
convention was only partly successful. 119 The Micronesian Constitution
was written to promote the principles that Micronesians considered essential
112 MELLER, supra note 107, at 372-77. See also Patsy T. Mink, Micronesia:Our Bungled Trust, 6
Tix. INTL L. J. 181, 198 (1970) (stressing the importance of the Congress of Micronesia in the islands'
overall political development).
11
3 LEmowrz supranote 1, at 501.
114 Id. at 642-46.
115 Id. at 644-45. While most of the districts of the TIPI sought greater autonomy through free association with the United States, a number of issues were beginning to divide the Northern Mariana District
from the rest of Micronesia. Id. at 528-29. The Northern Mariana Islands wanted a closer relationship with
the United States and did not espouse independence or free association. MCHENRY, supra note 82, at 141.
he Mariana Islands and the United States began separate negotiations in December of 1972. Id. These
negotiations were completed in 1975 when they agreed that the Northern Mariana Islands would have
commonwealth status. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976). For an
analysis of the separate path taken by the Mariana Islands, see L[aowrZ, supra note 1, at 519-93;
McHENRY, supra note 82, at 130-69; Hirayasu, supra note 19, at 522-36. The status of the Northern
Mariana Islands is more akin to integration than free association. IL at 526: Section 101 of the Covenant,
for example, provides that the Northern Mariana Islands will be under the sovereignty of the United States.
11

6 See MCHENRY supra note 82, at 99-100.

117 Alan B. Burdick, The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 8 U. HAW. L. REV.
419,425 (1986).
118 Id. at 424-25.
119 In addition to the Mariana Islands break away, both the Marshall Islands and Palau signed
compacts which are separate though equivalent to the one between the FSM and the United States. Prince,
supranote 14, at 53.
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to their future status.1 20 Most significantly, the Constitution asserted full
Micronesian sovereignty and the supremacy of their own constitutional
t2
government. '
In 1978, the Constitution was ratified by plebiscite in the island
groups of Yap, Pohnpei, Truk, and Kosrae. 122 The Constitution was
defeated in Palau and the Marshall Islands. 123 The four island groups that
ratified the Constitution joined together to become the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM), while Palau and the Marshall Islands adopted their own
124
constitutions and continued to negotiate separately with the United States.
The United States recognized the three new constitutional governments in
1979 through a U.S. Department of Interior Secretarial Order. 125 For all
three governments, the Constitutions, their ratification by Micronesians, and
their recognition by the United States represented a profound step toward
they became a colonized people,
self-determination: for the first time since
26
Micronesians asserted their sovereignty.1
Despite an occasional impasse, negotiations between the United
States and the three states seeking free association continued during the
1970's.127 In April 1978, in I-Ilo, Hawaii, representatives of the United
States, Palau, the FSM, and the Marshall Islands signed a statement of
for the future
agreed upon principles which furnished the foundation
128
relationships between the United States and these islands.
In 1982, negotiators from the FSM and Palau, and in 1983 negotiators
29
from the Marshall Islands, signed the final version of the Compact.1 This
was followed by U.N.-observed plebiscites in each of the three states. The
Compact of Free Association was approved by popular vote in the FSM and

120 Burdick, supra note 117, at 432-33. In 1969, the Congress of Micronesia endorsed the status of
free association, including four basic principles: 1) the sovereignty of the Micronesian people, 2) the right
to self-determination and self-government, 3) the right to adopt a constitution, and 4) the right to unilaterally terminate or alter their future relationship with the United States. LEmowrrz, supra note 1, at 64142.
121 Burdick, supranote 117, at 435.
122 Id. at 429.
123 Id.
124 Hirayasu, supranote 19, at 507.
125 Dept. of the Interior Order 3039, 44 Fed. Reg. 28, 116 (1979). See also Burdick, supra note 117,
at 430.
126 Burdick, supranote 117, at 433.
127 See LEmown7Z, supranote 1, at 642-50.
128 L.aowrTz, supra note 1, at 648; For the text of the Hilo Principles, see LEImowrrz, supra note
1, at 648 nA8.
129 Prince, supranote 14, at40 n.145.
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the Marshall Islands, but failed in Palau. 130 After U.S. Congressional
approval, President Reagan signed the Compact in 1986.131
D.

The Compact of FreeAssociation

The Compact of Free Association which governs current U.S.-FAS
relations is divided into a preamble and four titles: Governmental Relations,
Economic Relations, Security and Defense Relations, and General Provisions. 132 The preamble embodies many of the principles that Micronesians
considered fundamental to their self-determination. 133 The preamble
provides that the agreement is concluded on a government-to-government
and retain
basis. 134 Moreover, it states that the peoples of Micronesia have 135
their sovereignty and their sovereign right to self-determination. 136It also
states that the FAS are self-governing under their own constitutions.
Title One of the Compact, dealing with Governmental Relations, formally establishes self-government in the FAS. 137 The Compact also
recognizes that the FAS can conduct foreign affairs and make treaties "in
their own name and right."'138 These foreign affairs powers also include the
right to join regional and international organizations. 139 In addition, the
United States agrees to support FAS applications for such memberships.' 4 0
The areas of security and defense are excluded from the FAS's foreign
affairs powers and retained by the United States. 14 1 U.S. law no longer
130 Hirayasu, supra note 19, at 508. Palau remains a trust territory because the United States and
Palau have failed to reach a complete agreement on their future relationship. Until only recently, Palau's
Constitution required 75% approval by popular vote in order to grant the United States the right to transport nuclear vessels through the country. This right is currently afforded to the United States under the
Compact, which is not yet effective. The United States refuses to cede any ground on this issue. After
seven plebiscites, the Palauan people still have not approved the Compact by the necessary margin. Jon
Hinck, The Republic of Palau and the United States: Self-Determination Becomes the Price of Free
Association, 78 CAL. L. REV. 915, 915-17 (1990). Palau, however, has recently amended its constitution to
allow the Compact to be approved by a simple majority vote. It is likely that this will expedite the termiVote to
nation of the Trusteeship for Palau and bring Palau into the status of free association. Palauns[sic]
Ease Repeal of Anti-nuclear Provisions, The British Broadcasting Corporation; Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 19,1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File.
131 Hirayasu, supranote 19, at 511.
132 Compact, supranote 2.
133 Id., pmbl. See supranote 111.
134 ld.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id tit.LarI,§ 111.
H, § 121.
tiL 1,art.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. tit. I, art IL § 122.
141 Id. tit. IM,art. L §§ 311-16.
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applies to the FAS except where specifically provided. 142 The sovereignty
of the FAS, therefore, is limited only by the security and defense authority
allocated to the United States by the Compact.143
Title Two of the Compact governs economic relations. 144 Article I,
entitled "Grant Assistance," delineates the assistance the United States must
allocate to the FAS for developing economic self-sufficiency in the
islands. 145 For the first year following the Compact, the Marshall Islands
and the FSM received $97.6 million in grant assistance. 146 The amount of
financial assistance is scheduled to gradually decrease through the life of the
Compact.147 Additionally, specific federal programs such as aid in building
infrastructure projects, and money for communications, health148care, and
scholarships are included under Article II, "Program Assistance."
The economic value of these specific federal programs is relatively
small in comparison to the grant assistance. 149 Most of the special programs
were phased out over a period of three years.' 50 The front-end loading of
the grant assistance, the three year phase out of the program assistance, and
the relatively small number of specific federal programs were intended to
diminish the FAS' dependency and allow them to fashion their plans for
development according to their own priorities. 151
Title Three covers security and defense relations between the United
States and the FAS.152 The United States retains full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in the islands. 153 This authority includes: 1) the obligation to defend the islands from attack; 2) the option to
foreclose access to the islands for the military purposes of any third country;
and 3) the option to establish and use military areas in the islands.154 These

142
143
144
145

I tit. I, art. VI, § 171.
LEmowrZ, supra note 1, at 657-59.
Compact, supranote 2, tit. 1.
Id. tit. II, art. I, §§ 211-19.

146 Arthur John Armstrong, Strategic Underpinningsof the Legal Regime of Free Association: The

Negotiationsfor the FuturePoliticalStatus of Micronesia,7 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 179,215 (1982).
147 Compact supranote 2, lit. I, art. I, § 211. This arrangement is referred to as front-end loading.
148 I tit.L , art. Il, §§ 221-27.
149 Armstrong, supranote 146, at 215.
150 Implementation of the Compact of 1985: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insular
and InternationalAffairs of the House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 13
(1989) (statement of Larry L. Morgan, Director of Legislative and Public Affairs, Office of Territorial and
International Affairs) [hereinafter 1989 Oversight Hearing].
151 1989 OversightHearing,supranote 150; Armstrong, supra note 146, at 215.
152 Compact, supranote 2, lit. Hll.
153 Id. ti 111, art I, § 311.
154 Id.
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military privileges are subject to principles of international law and the
Charter of the U.N. 155
Title Four contains a provision which allows the FAS to unilaterally
terminate the relationship with the United States subject to notice requirements. 156 This ensures that the relationship will remain consistent with the
freely expressed will of the citizens of the FAS as expressed by
plebiscite. 157 This last provision, though controversial from the U.S.
perspective, was necessary in order to meet the U.N. definition of "selfgoverning."158 It was also a key element in attaining self-determination for
159
the Micronesians.
E.

Post Compact Developments

November 3, 1986, marked the effective date of the implementation
of the Compact and termination of the Trusteeship with respect to the FSM
and the Marshall Islands.160 Since then, both the United States and the FAS
have sought to effectuate the rights of self-determination and selfgovernment embodied in the Compact.161 For example, the United States
Department of the Interior transferred access to federal programs from the
Trust Territory government directly to the FAS, rather than using the
remaining Trust Territory government as a conduit. 162 The U.S. also
upgraded diplomatic relations with the FAS to the ambassadorial level,
155 Id
156 Id tit. V, art.IV, § 443.
157 Armstrong, supranote 146, at 229, 232.
158 Cf., Manuel Rodrfguez-Oreilana, In Contemplation of Micronesiaw The Prospects for the
Decolonizationof Puerto Rico Under InternationalLaw 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. R. 457,462 (1987).
note 187.
See infra
15 9 LmEowrrz, supra note 1, at 669.
160 The Trusteeship Agreement itself did not set forth the terms of termination. Following the implementation of the Compact, the United States claimed that the Trusteeship Council Resolution, along
with Presidential Proclamation 5546 (Nov. 3, 1986), constituted the necessary procedure to put the Compact into effect and terminate the Trusteeship. LEmowrrz, supranote 1. at 598. However, a number of
commentators argued that termination of the Trusteeship required approval by the U.N. Security Council.
Prince, supranote 14, at 13; LEraowriz, supra note 1, at 598-99. This debate was silenced on December
22, 1990, when the U.N. Security Council voted to approve termination of the Trusteeship with respect to
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess. 2972nd mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
161 See generally 1989 OversightHearing,supranote 150. See also Implementation of the Compact
of Free Association Act in the Marshall Islands and the FederatedStates of Micronesia: Oversight
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Insular and InternationalAffairs of the House Comm. on Interiorand
InsularAffairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 OversightHearing].
162 Id, at 9-12 (statement of Kittie Baler, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior for
Territorial and International Affairs).
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ensuring recognition by the international community for the FAS.1 63 These
policies demonstrate the U.S. commitment to continue promoting selfgovernment by preventing U.S. interference.
The FAS have been successful in acquiring international recognition.
For example, in September of 1991, the U.N. General Assembly accepted
the FAS as full members of the General Assembly. 164 Greater independence
has also enabled the FAS to participate as members in a number of regional
organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and the South Pacific
166
Forum. 165 Currently, 28 countries recognize the FSM as a nation state.
V.

U.S.-MCRONESIAN RELATIONS AS
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW

AN

ESTABLISHED

NORM

OF

As negotiations between the United States and Micronesians neared
fruition, leaders of other U.S.-Pacific areas queried what the implications of
the compact would be for their own people. 167 Leaders from Guam,
American Samoa, and the State of Hawaii sought to render the Compact a8
precedent for establishing an improved political status for their people.16
U.S. policy-makers denied the Compact's value as a precedent for granting
169
the right of self-determination to other U.S. controlled areas, however.
Moreover, these U.S. controlled territories are not alone because, as noted
above, numerous territories around the world remain non-self-governing.
This section shows how a norm emerges from U.S. action in
Micronesia according to the principles of customary international law.
Before the case of Micronesia can rise to the level of an international norm
163 Marian Nash Leich, ContemporaryPracticeof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 237-39 (1990).
164 Admission of the FederatedStates of Micronesia to Membership in the United Nations, GA.
Res. 46/2, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 12, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1992); Admission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to Membership in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 46/3, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 12, U.N. Doe. A/46/49 (1992); Robert C. Toth, Divided Koreas, Baltics, 2 Island
States Join U.N., L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1991, at A4.
165 State of the Nation Message, NATN'L UNION, SuPp., June-July, 1992, at 1 (The NATIONAL UNION
is the official newspaper of the FSM).
166 Id at 1. The ability to participate in the world community as a nation is expected to afford the
FAS a greater opportunity to pursue balanced economic development. Haglelgam, supra note 84, at 11-12.
1 7 See generally Implications of the Compact of Free Association on the United States Pacific
Islands: Oversight HearingBefore the House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 99th Cong., 1stSess.
(1985) (hereinafter 1985 OversightHearing).
168 Id. at 8-9 (statement by Ben Blaz, Congressional Delegate from Guam); id at 101 (position
paper on Compact by F. R. Santos, representative to the Guam Legislature); id at 53 (statement by Peter T.
Coleman, former Governor of American Samoa); id. at 66 (Testimony by Daniel K. Akaka, Senator from
Id at 3-4.
Hawa1
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it must be shown that it satisfies the two elements necessary for establishing
customary law. These elements are that, first, U.S. actions in Micronesia
must have been an
must constitute repeated state practice and, second, there
170
articulated rule of law attached to such state practice.
A.

The State PracticeElement

Although security interests dominated the first 17 years of U.S. administration, the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia marked the
171
beginning of policies that promoted Micronesian political development.
This was followed by U.S. recognition of Micronesian sovereignty and right
to self-determination in the Micronesian Constitution. 172 U.S.-Micronesian
negotiations eventually led to the Compact of Free Association which
upheld principles of self-determination, self-government, and sovereignty.
Approval of U.S. action in the FAS by four members of the U.N.
Trusteeship Council and 14 members of the U.N. Security Council also constitutes state action which in turn reinforces the strength of the norm.173 By
endorsing the Compact, members of the U.N. participated in the practice of
effectuating Micronesian self-determination. The approval by the United
Kingdom and France is especially significant, because, together with the
United States, these countries administer 15 of the remaining 18 trust and
non-self-governing territories. 174 Because these countries are more involved
in the administration of trust and non-self-governing territories, their partici170 The first element is quantitative, focusing on the action of a state or states. The second is quaIlitative, focusing on whether the state action was preceded or contemporaneous with the articulation of
international legal obligation. Thus, the emergence or existence of a customary rule or norm is demonstrated by a showing that an articulation of a rule of law, an opiniojuris,has been taken up as the basis for
repeated state practice. ANrONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM ININTERNATIONAL LAw 73-88
(1971).17 1See also D.W. GRIEG, INTERNATIONALLAW 17-30 (2d ed. 1976).
See suprapart IVA-B.
172 See suprapart IV.C-D.
173 GRIE, supra note 170, at 23 (noting that the voting behavior by members of international organizations constitutes state action). In 1986, three out of five members of the Trusteeship Council
(France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) endorsed the Compact and voted for termination of
the Trusteeship while one voted against (the Soviet Union). China did not take part in the 1986 proceedings, but in 1989, joined the majority in voting for termination of the Trusteeship. Prince, supra note 14, at
12 n. 4.
Approval from the U.N. Security Council came in 1990 when 14 countries endorsed the Compact.
These countries included: Canada, China, Colombia, Cote dlvoire, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Malaysia,
Romania, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yemen, and Zaire. ANNUAL REVIEW
OF UNrIED NATIONS AFFAnRS 53 (Kumiko Matsuura et al. eds., 1990). Cuba was the lone dissenter in the
Security Council vote. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2972d mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
174 See supranote 4.
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pation carries greater weight in establishing the norms regarding such ad175
ministration.
In addition to satisfying its obligations under the U.N., the United
States continues to promote self-determination for the FAS by facilitating
the entry of the FAS into the international legal community. This may be
seen in the amendment to the Compact that provides for an upgraded
process of foreign relations between the United States and the FAS. 176
Thus, U.S. practice in conjunction with U.N. practice fulfills the quantitative
element of international customary law, i.e. repeated state action
177
effectuating the right of self-determination in Micronesia.
B.

The Opinio Juris Element

Two aspects of U.S.-Micronesian relations point to an opinio juris,
the second element of customary international law. First, the U.S. practice
of effectuating Micronesian self-determination conformed to and
specifically responded to international legal obligations imposed by various
sources. 178 Obligations imposed by the U.N. Charter, U.N. instruments such
as Resolution 1514, and the emergence of the general right to selfdetermination as a norm of customary law all reflect opiniojuris. The U.N.
Charter was in place as the United States assumed its trust responsibility in
Micronesia. U.N. instruments subsequent to the Charter reaffirmed the right
of self-determination while the United States carried out its policy in
Micronesia. Thus, the underlying legal obligation to promote the right of
self-determination had been articulated before the United States developed
its policy and continued to be articulated through international legal
instruments and state practice world-wide while the United States
effectuated self-determination for Micronesia.
Second, the United States, on at least two occasions, explicitly stated
that it had a duty to promote self-determination in Micronesia under international law. In September, 1970, Richard Gimer, a U.S. Representative to the
U.N. General Assembly made a statement in support of U.N. Resolution
2625:

175 See GRIEG, supranote 170, at 20.
176 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
177 Cf. Hirayasu, supra note 19, at 500 (noting that the United States did all that it could to further
the political advancement of the Micronesian people).
178 See supranotes 103-12 and accompanying text.
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[Tihe United States is glad that the declaration recognizes the
right of self-determination as belonging to 'all peoples.' Important as the right is to the peoples of dependent territories, the
principle of self-determination is universal in scope ....[The
United States [also] supports the statement of obligation 'to
bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned' because of the
importance we attach to the wishes of dependent peoples
themselves. In the context of dependent territories, United
States administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands and the other non-self-governing territoriesfor which
the United States has been responsible has been based on the
view that the future of these territories is not something that
179
can be determined in New York nor in Washington alone.
In a House and Senate joint resolution approving the Compact, the
United States again evinced its sense of international legal obligation:
Whereas the United States, in accordance with the Trusteeship
Agreement, the Charter of the United Nations and the
objectives of the [UInternational [T]rusteeship [S]ystem, has
promoted the development of the peoples of the Trust Territory
toward self-government or independence . . . and in
consideration of its own obligations under the Trusteeship
Agreement to promote self-determination, entered into political
status negotiations with representatives of the peoples of the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands...
.180

It is clear, therefore, that in implementing the right of self-determination in Micronesia, the United States and the rest of the international community were aware that such action was required under international law as
embodied in numerous sources. 18 1
179 Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations, 63 DEP'r ST. BuLu 623, 625-26 (1970)
(statement by Richard H. Gimer, U.S. Alternative Representative to the U.N. General Assembly) (emphasis
added [hereinafter Statement by Richard Gimer].
Joint Resolution to Approve the Compact of Free Association, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770
(1981 At the minimum, the opiniojuriselement requires that the acting state
be put on notice of the
articulation of the legal obligation. Anthony DAmato, What "Counts" as Law, in LAw-MAKING INTHE
1982).
GLOBAL COMMUNrry 83, 101 (Nicholas Greenwood Onuf ed.,
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The combination of the repeated state practice in implementing
Micronesian self-determination and opinio juris crystallize to form a new
norm of international customary law.18 2 At the minimum, this norm
requires those countries that administer trust and non-self-governing
territories to effectuate the right to self-determination as set forth in U.N.
instruments.18 3 It also prohibits administering authorities from taking
positions which impede attempts by trust and non-self-governing territories
to achieve self-determination.
VI.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONTENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NORM
ESTABLISHED THROUGH THE CASE OF MICRONESIA

As shown above, U.S.-Micronesian relations establish a norm for effectuating the right to self-determination. Even so, questions remain as to
the content and implementation of this right. Four aspects of the U.S.Micronesian relationship aid in understanding the definition and
implementation of the right of self-determination. The first defines selfdetermination, the next two focus on the procedure involved in the right to
self-determination, and the final aspect deals with the substance of the right
to self-determination.
As demonstrated in the case of Micronesia, the definition of selfdetermination emphasizes free political processes rather than a specific governmental status. The United States acknowledged that self-determination is
expressed through "the process by which a people determine their own sovereign status." 184 In accordance with this definition, the FAS conducted
their plebiscites with no interference by the United States, 185 and retain the
authority to modify their status. 186 Thus, the specific substantive agreement
between the two political entities is not as important as is the process used in
182 Professor DAmato describes the emergence of a norm as follows: "Once the act takes place, the
previously articulated rule that is consistent with the act takes on life as a rule of customary law, while the
previously articulated rules contrary to it remain in the realm of speculation. The state's act is visible, real,
and significant; it crystallizes policy and demonstrates which of the many possible rules of law the acting
state has decided to manifest. This conjunction of rule and action becomes a powerful precedent for future
ANTHONY A. DAMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM ININTERNATIONAL LAW 88
similar situations ....
(197 143 The content of the norm is inferred from the conduct which constitutes the state practice. GJ.H.
VAN HOO,

RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (1983); S. James Anaya, Indigenous

Rights Norms In ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 8 ARZ. J. INT'L COMP. L. 1, 8-9 (1991).
184 MHENRY, supranote 82, at 41.
185 Hirayasu, supra note 19, at 508. For a more detailed discussion of the use of plebiscites in the
process of self-determination, see id. at 501-11.
186 See supratext accompanying notes 156 and 157.
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arriving at the agreement. Self-determination requires free choice by the
electorate in a democratic election. Further, the election must be free of outside interference. Finally, the territory or people must retain the authority to
subsequently select an alternate status. This approach to self-determination,
pursued through free processes, is also in accordance with U.N. Resolution
1541, which provides the benchmark for whether a territory has attained
self-government. 187
A second and corollary aspect of the right to self-determination demonstrated in the case of Micronesia is the need for malleability on the part of
those who are negotiating the terms of political status. Such an approach is
mandated by U.N. Charter Articles 76 and 73, both of which required the
United States, as the administering authority, to take into account the
"particular circumstances of [the] territory" as Micronesia was guided
toward self-determination. The Compact of Free Association was able to
reconcile three competing interests in the United States-Micronesian
relationship, including: 1) the right of Micronesians to self-government and
and 3) Micronesian
2) U.S. security interests;
self-determination;
188
dependence on the United States for defense and economic assistance.
These three interests were harmonized by affording complete internal and
partial external self-government to the FAS, and granting military privileges
to the United States. 189 In return for military privileges, the United States
continues to provide financial assistance to the islands. 190 Thus, the United
States has remained flexible in its negotiations with Micronesia.
The relationship embodied in the Compact is unique in U.S. territorial
law and has little precedent in international law. 19 1 In approaching issues of
self-determination, administering authorities must be flexible in pursuing ar187 G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
Resolution 1541 was adopted one day after the adoption of Resolution 1514. Resolution 1541 states that
"A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by: (a)
Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State." Resolution 1541 also sets forth factors to be considered in determining
whether the chosen status is sufficient to establish self-government including the requirement that the
process involve "a free and voluntary choice through informed and democratic processes." Also among the
factors are that there be self-government in internal matters, and that the people have the right to modify
the status of the territory through democratic means. Id. See also Prince, supra note 14, at 42-45;
POMERANCE, supranote 12, at 24-25.
188 See supra partlV.D.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 LEmowrrz, supra note 1,at 595. The Cook Islands, in 1965, and Niue, in 1974, achieved a free
association relationship with New Zealand which was formally approved by the U.N. HANNUM, supranote
9, at 384-85.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 2 No. 2

rangements which accommodate a variety of competing interests. 192 Equating self-determination with independence or any other single political status
ignores the fact that the principle can be effectuated through numerous arrangements, including various degrees of local autonomy, free association,
various forms of self-government, merger, and other forms of participation
in government. 193 Thus, the process by which self-determination comes
about must be flexible.
Third, the process of self-determination in Micronesia was brought
about through the development of political institutions in the islands. Both
the Congress of Micronesia and the Micronesian Constitution played an essential role in the political advancement of the Micronesian people. The
Congress of Micronesia, for example, brought about integration of the
various island groups, information distribution, and wider political
participation by Micronesians. In the area of integration, the Congress of
Micronesia helped soften the political and cultural distinctions among the
various Micronesian islands, and was partially successful in forming a
consensus on a Micronesian identity. 194 Another important function of the
Congress was its role as an information conduit. The Congress provided a
forum through which the desires of the Micronesian people were made
known to the various representatives of the United States. 195 Lastly, the
Congress spurred political participation throughout the various communities
of Micronesia. Through political institutions, Micronesians developed the
political infrastructure and sophistication which allowed them to discard the
plenary authority of the United States Congress and attain full internal and
partial external self-government. Thus, developing internal institutions of
government appears to be essential in any plan to effectuate the right of self196
determination.

192 Such an approach conforms to relevant U.N. provisions. Cf.Prince, supra note 14, at 58
(arguing that both Article 76 and Resolution 2625 support flexibility with regard to structuring a free association relationship). Resolution 2625 states that "the establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political
statusfreely determinedby a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by
that pleole." Resolution 2625,supranote 30 (emphasis added).
UMOZURKE, supra note 9, at 194. See also HANNum, supra note 9,at 41, 333,467; Buchanan,
supranote 36, at 46 (arguing that self-determination is best achieved "in different circumstances by a range
of more specific rights, including a number of distinct group rights to varying forms and degrees of
").
political autonomy ....
194 MaLLER, supra note 107, at 373-74.
195 Id. at 375.
196 See HANNUM, supranote 9, at 466 (noting that the "creation of representative local governmental
structures is fundamental to most demands for autonomy").
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Finally, the importance of local autonomy must not be overlooked in
effectuating self-determination. The primary distinction between current
U.S.-Micronesian relations and relations under the Trusteeship consists of
the facts that the FAS are now self-governing,197 and that they were able to
freely choose that status. 198 The core of the right to self-determination,
therefore, consists in a level of political autonomy sufficient to enable a
group to control its own destiny.199
VII.

THE NORM ESTABLISHED THROUGH U.S.-MICRONESIAN RELATIONS
EXTENDS BEYOND THE INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

In effectuating the right of self-determination in Micronesia, the
United States was acting under a broader body of law than the legal duties
imposed by the Trusteeship System alone. The norm established by U.S.
action in Micronesia should similarly extend beyond the Trusteeship System
to affect other administering authorities in their relationship with the
territories which they govern. 200 Again, the relationship between the United
States and Guam provides a prime example for analysis of how this norm
applies not only to trust territories but to all non-self-governing
territories. 201 The norm established through U.S.-Micronesian relations
applies to Guam because the U.S. was acting under a broader framework of
international law, and because the broader framework includes Guam.
197 Hirayasu, supra note 19, at 515.
198 See Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the MarshallIslands,September 1983, U.N. TCOR Supp. 51st Sess. No. 2 at 14, U.N. Doe. T/1865 (1984); Report of the
United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in the Federated States of Micronesia, Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, June 1983, U.N. TCOR Supp. 51st No. 1 at 19, U.N. Doc. T/1860;
-irayasu, supranote 19, at 507-11.
199 Anaya, supranote 183, at 30.
200 The norm is applicable to all countries which continue to administer trust and non-self-governing
territories. See supra note 4. In some cases, however, the country recognized by the U.N. as the administering authority, is not the country which maintains defacto control over the territory. This is the case
in East Timor, where Portugal is the official administering authority but Indonesia exercises complete
control. 1991 U.N.Y.B. 798, U.N. Sales No. E.92.L1. In such a case, the norm should also apply to the
country which maintains defacto control over the territory.
201 Becanse the United States, as the administering authority, was the primary actor in the case of
Micronesia, the norm has particular force with respect to the duties of the United States in effectuating the
right of self-determination in other U.S. territories which are non-self-governing such as the United States
Virgin Islands and American Samoa. See van Hoof, supra note 183, at 97 (arguing that a norm of customary law primarily applies to those state actors who participated or consented to the creation of the
norm). See generally L.mowriz, supra note 1 (providing a comprehensive analysis of U.S. territorial
relations); see supranote 71, Leland R. Bettis, PoliticalContext of the Relationship,remarks at "A Time of
Change," National Conference, Washington D.C., (Feb. 9, 1993) (transcript available at Office of Guam
Commission on Self-Determination, Agana, Guam).
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Article 73 of the U.N. CharterApplies to Both Micronesiaand Guam

The U.N. maintains its jurisdiction over Guam as a non-self202 Likewise,
governing territory under Article 73 of the U.N. Charter.
former U.S. relations with Micronesia were governed by Article 73 because
203
the islands of Micronesia constituted a non-self-governing territory.
U.S.-Micronesian relations were governed by both Articles 73 and 76, and,
therefore, the norm established by U.S.-Micronesian relations extends
beyond the legal framework of Article 76 to include Article 73 territories
such as Guam. Regardless of whether U.S.-Micronesian relations explicitly
come under Article 73, the norm established at least implicitly applies to
both trust and non-self-governing territories because the right of selfdetermination which is embodied in Article 76 is essentially the same as that
embodied in Article 73.204
B.

U.N. Instruments Subsequent to the Adoption of the U.N. Charter
Apply to Both Micronesia and Guam

An additional basis for analyzing the FAS and Guam under the same
is that both resolutions 1514 and 2625 applied to U.S. govframework
legal
ernance of Micronesia and continue to apply to U.S. governance of Guam.
U.N. resolution 1514 constituted part of the international legal backdrop to
the negotiations which led to the formation of the Compact in
Micronesia. 205 The policy shift toward greater political development taken
by the United States in the early 1960's was in part due to the demands of
Resolution 1514 and U.N. action surrounding its adoption. By its terms,
Resolution 1514's mandate encompasses both trusteeships and non-selfthat this
governing territories. Further, the United States has acknowledged
20 6
Guam.
with
relations
U.S.
to
apply
to
continues
resolution
Resolution 2625 expressed that all peoples have the right of self-determination. 207 Beginning with Resolution 2625, the United States
208
explicitly endorsed the right of self-determination contained therein.
202 See suprapart lIn.D.
203 See supranotes 17-19 and accompanying text.
204 See supranotes 20-22 and accompanying text.
205 McHENRY, supra note 82, at 12-13.
206 Guam: Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. GAOR, Special Comm. on
Decolonization, at 8, U.N. Doe. A/AC.109/1111 (1992); G.A. Res. 43/42, supra note 44, at para. 3.
207 See supra text accompanying note 30.
208 Statement by Richard Gimer, supra note 179.
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Moreover, the United States recognized that the right of self-determination
embodied in Resolution 2625 applies to the United States' administration of
both the Trust Territory and other non-self-governing territories. 209
Thus, the United States' obligation to promote the right of selfdetermination in Micronesia derived not only from Article 76 and the
Trusteeship Agreement, but also from Article 76, and U.N. Resolutions
1514 and 2625. The applicability of the norm should be coextensive with
the body of law under which the norm developed. For these reasons, U.S.
relations with Micronesia establish a customary law norm which reaches
beyond the obligation imposed by Article 76 to include all non-selfgoverning territories such as Guam.
VIII. THE GUAM COMMONWEALTH ACT PRESENTS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO MEET ITS OBLIGATION TO EFFECTUATE

GUAMANIAN SELF-DETERMINATION

As was the case in Micronesia, U.S. approval of the GCA would mark
Guam's first break from a long period of colonial rule.2 10 Without exploring
in detail whether the GCA grants Guamanians a sufficient level of political
autonomy to effectuate their right to self-determination, three general
aspects of the GCA suggest that it does constitute a valid expression of selfdetermination. First, it embodies principles of self-government and selfdetermination which are consistent with the freely expressed wishes of
Guamanians. 211 Second, in 1988, the U.N. General Assembly specifically
endorsed the GCA. 2 12 Third, the GCA affords Guam a significant measure
of autonomy over its current status, accomplished primarily through its
provisions on mutual consent over the applicability of U.S. law to Guam.
The first mutual consent provision, Section 103, states:
[Tihe United States agrees to limit the exercise of its authority
so that the provisions of this Act may be modified only with the
mutual consent of the Government of the United States and the
2 13
Government of the Commonwealth of Guam.

209 Id.
210
211
212
213

Interview with Leland Bettis, supranote 66.
See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
GA. Res. 43142, supra note 44.
Guam Commonwealth Act, supranote 66, § 103.
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would give Guam protection
The second mutual consent provision 214
from further federal legislation and regulation.
The mutual consent provisions are a touchstone for evaluating the
U.S. stance on Guamanian self-determination. This is because, as noted
before, Guamanians view these provisions as integral to their achievement
of self-determination. As Guam representatives negotiated with a U.S.
federal inter-agency task force in 1992, they continued to urge adoption of
the mutual consent provisions. 215 The task force responded with
intransigence, stating that "the Task Force believes that the [U.S.] Congress
must resist accepting constraints upon its legislative authority or upon
federal regulatory authority." 2 16 The task force further stated that it "objects
to [S]ection 103 and any other type of mutual consent provision."
The U.S. can not justify denying Guam the right to self-determination
that Micronesia has achieved without violating international law. The approach taken by U.S. policy-makers runs counter to the norm established by
U.S.-Micronesian relations which requires administering authorities to
effectuate the right of self-determination as set forth in U.N. instruments.
The norm established through U.S.-Micronesian relations also militates
against U.S. intransigence because implementation of the norm requires
malleability in approaching the questions of political status and the means to
achieving self-determination.
X.

CONCLUSION

Although U.N. Resolution 1514 proclaimed the "necessity of bringing
to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and
manifestations," 2 17 vestiges of colonialism continue to survive. The
persistence of colonial attitudes caused the U.N. to urge the eradication of
colonialism by the year 2000, with the hope of spurring on administering
authorities to effectuate the right of self-determination in trust and non-selfgoverning territories. These colonial attitudes also cause anger in the
territories: Guam's leaders and citizens, for example, grow increasingly
214 Section 202 of the Guam Commonwealth Act reads: "Except as otherwise intended by this Act,
or regulations passed after the date of this Act shall apply to the Commonwealth of
no Federal laws, rules
Guam unless mutually consented to by the United States and the Government of the Commonwealth of
Guam."
215 Second Federal Inter-Agency Task ForceReport on H.R. 98, the Guam Commonwealth Bill,
Jan., 1993, at 29.
216 Id.
217 Resolution 1514, supranote 27.
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impatient with U.S. intransigence in refusing to effectuate Guamanian selfdetermination.
As administering authorities consider proposals to effectuate the right
of self-determination in the territories they govern, they should be mindful
of their obligation to promote self-determination under relevant U.N. instruments. Additionally, administering authorities should adhere to the norm
which emerged from U.S. action in Micronesia which requires them to
effectuate the right of self-determination as set forth in U.N. instruments.
The United States, in particular, should view the Guam Commonwealth Act
as an opportunity to meet its obligation to Guam to effectuate Guamanian
self-determination.

